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Abstract An increasing amount of posts on social media are used for dissem-
inating news information and are accompanied by multimedia content. Such
content may often be misleading or be digitally manipulated. More often than
not, such pieces of content reach the front pages of major news outlets, having
a detrimental effect on their credibility. To avoid such effects, there is profound
need for automated methods that can help debunk and verify online content
in very short time. To this end, we present a comparative study of three such
methods that are catered for Twitter, a major social media platform used for
news sharing. Those include: a) a method that uses textual patterns to extract
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claims about whether a tweet is fake or real and attribution statements about
the source of the content; b) a method that exploits the information that same-
topic tweets should be also similar in terms of credibility; and c) a method
that uses a semi-supervised learning scheme that leverages the decisions of two
independent credibility classifiers. We perform a comprehensive comparative
evaluation of these approaches on datasets released by the Verifying Multime-
dia Use (VMU) task organized in the context of the 2015 and 2016 MediaEval
benchmark. In addition to comparatively evaluating the three presented meth-
ods, we devise and evaluate a combined method based on their outputs, which
outperforms all three of them. We discuss these findings and provide insights
to guide future generations of verification tools for media professionals.
Keywords Fake Detection · Verification · Credibility · Veracity · Trust ·
Social Media · Twitter · Multimedia
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a tremendous increase in the use of social media plat-
forms such as Twitter and Facebook as a means of sharing news content and
multimedia, and as a source and sensor of trends and events [1]. The simplicity
of the sharing process has led to large volumes of news content propagating
over social networks and reaching huge numbers of readers in very short time.
Especially multimedia posts (images, videos) can very quickly reach huge au-
diences and become viral due to the fact that they are easily consumed.
Given the speed of the news spreading process and the competition of news
outlets and individual news sources to publish first, the verification of informa-
tion and content is often carried out in a superficial manner or even completely
neglected. This leads to the appearance and spread of large amounts of fake
media content. In particular, when a news event breaks (e.g., a natural dis-
aster), and new information and media coverage is of primary importance,
news professionals turn to social media to source potentially interesting and
informative content. It is exactly this setting, when the risk of fake content be-
coming widely disseminated is the highest. By fake, we refer to any publication
or post with multimedia content that does not represent accurately the event
that it refers to. It may be reposted content falsely associated with a current
event, digitally manipulated content, computer-generated imagery presented
as real imagery or speculations regarding the association of persons with a
current event. In a similar way, by real we refer to posts with content that
rightly represent the event they claim to. There are also posts that, despite
sharing fake multimedia content, explicitly report that the content is fake (e.g.
to warn readers) or they refer to it with a sense of humour; those are excluded
from our study.
An example of reposted content is a widely shared photo of two young
children hugging each other (Fig. 1 (a)). The image was claimed to depict
a brother who is protecting his little sister during the earthquake in Nepal
(April 2015), but it was later reported that it was taken a decade ago in
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Fig. 1: (a) Siblings’ photo from Vietnam reposted as being from Nepal earth-
quake. (b) Fake media content spread during the Malaysian airlines breaking
news story.
a province of Vietnam by a professional photographer. In some cases, the
consequences of fake content reaching a very large part of the population can
be quite severe. For example, fake images became popular on social media
after the Malaysia Airlines passenger flight disappeared on 8th March (Fig.
1 (b) illustrates an example). During the investigation of the plane trace,
false alarms that the plane was detected came up. Taking into account how
sensitive the case was, the circulation of this content deeply affected the people
directly involved in it, such as the families of the passengers, causing emotional
distress. An extended analysis on rumour propagation during the London riots
[32] concluded that rumours typically start with someone tweeting about an
incident, which then gets re-tweeted and reposted in a number of variations.
An interactive representation1 of the riots’ rumours across time shows the
velocity with which fake information propagated and the fact that hours, even
days are needed to debunk such false claims.
There are several challenges that journalists face in the process of assess-
ing the veracity of user-generated content. Notably, “traditional” digital media
verification techniques employed by journalists [34], e.g. looking into the Exif
metadata2 of content or getting in touch with the person that published it,
are often not possible or very slow due to the characteristics of social me-
dia platforms. For instance, Twitter and Facebook remove the Exif metadata
from posted images, and Twitter accounts in most cases provide no contact
information (e.g., email, telephone number). Furthermore, conventional image
forensics approaches are hardly applicable due to the image resizing and re-
compression operations that are automatically applied by these social media
platforms to all uploaded content [38].
1 http://www.theguardian.com/uk/interactive/2011/dec/07/london-riots-twitter
2 Exif metadata contain information about the date, time and location an image was
taken, the model of the device, and copyright information, which can be very useful when
assessing the credibility of multimedia content [34].
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The above challenges highlight the need for novel tools that can help news
professionals assess the credibility of online content. To this end, we present
and compare three automated approaches to solve this problem on Twitter.
This study is based on the Verifying Multimedia Use (VMU) task [4] that was
organized as part of the 2015 and 2016 editions of the MediaEval initiative3,
with the goal to benchmark methods on the problem of automatically pre-
dicting whether a tweet that shares multimedia content is misleading (fake)
or trustworthy (real). The presented approaches [7,21,26] are the ones that
competed in this task and include a) a method that uses attribution in tan-
dem with fake and genuine claim extraction, b) a method that verifies tweets
by exploring inter-tweet information, and c) one that uses a semi-supervised
learning scheme. This study conducts and presents a comprehensive compar-
ison between them in a more extended experimental setting, and draws ac-
tionable insights regarding the strengths and weaknesses of each method. In
particular, the main contributions of this article include the following:
– We describe a new benchmark dataset based on a revised and extended
version of the MediaEval dataset. Our revised dataset has duplicate and
near-duplicate tweets removed and its cross-event balance improved to re-
duce content bias towards more popular events. This dataset is publicly
available for other researchers to use for benchmarking.
– We report a new experimental analysis using this new benchmark dataset
following a leave-one-event-out cross-validation scheme. Each of our fake
classification approaches is evaluated and its ability to predict the veracity
of content analysed and contrasted.
– We present results derived from an ensemble of the three fake classification
approaches. We analyze the advantages of the ensemble-based approach
and show that it is more effective in classifying fake content than each
individual method on its own. This result provides a benchmark for other
researchers to compare against in the future.
2 Background
Classifying online content with respect to its credibility and veracity is a highly
complex problem that has been studied in multiple settings and using a variety
of approaches. Our work focuses on the problem of single post verification,
i.e. classifying an individual content item as being fake or real. This is in
contrast to the related problem of rumour detection [41], which considers that a
piece of false information is spreading across social networks. Although rumour
detection is a highly relevant research problem and several methodological
aspects are common with those arising in our problem setting, the following
discussion is mostly focusing on single post verification approaches.
Several of the previous studies in the area focused on the statistical analysis
on social media with the goal of extracting features that can be used as robust
3 http://multimediaeval.org/
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verification indicators for classifying social media content (sec. 2.1). Another
field of study concerns methods for assessing the credibility of the source (or
user account), where a post of interest originates (sec. 2.2). A different re-
search area concerns the development of image forensics approaches that can
potentially provide valuable complementary signals to the verification process
(sec. 2.3). We also present in sec. 2.4 a few systems that attempt to solve
the problem by leveraging methods and results from the works of sec. 2.1-2.3.
Finally, we provide a description of the Verifying Multimedia Use (VMU) task
(sec. 2.5) that constitutes the basis for our experimental study.
2.1 Verification cues for social media content
Several previous studies focus on the automatic extraction of credibility cues
from the content of social media posts, either by using Natural Language
Processing from the posts’ text or by extracting other features. For instance,
Castillo et al. [11] presented a supervised learning method to assess content
credibility in Twitter. They extract discussion topics that are categorized as
news or chat by human annotators and they build a model to automatically de-
termine which topics are newsworthy by assigning a credibility label to them.
Martinez-Romo et al. [25] retrieve tweets associated with trending topics and
use blacklists to detect spam URLs in them. Then, they introduce language
models based on probability distributions over pieces of text and by adding
content features, they apply several models to evaluate their approach, which
achieves high accuracy in classifying tweets with spam content. O’Donovan et
al. [29] performed an analysis of the utility of various features when predict-
ing content credibility. First, they collected Twitter data derived from very
different contexts and they defined a set of features including content-based
features, user profile features, and others that focus on the dynamics of infor-
mation flow. Then, by checking the distribution of each feature category across
Twitter topics, they concluded that their usefulness can greatly vary with con-
text, both in terms of the occurrence of a particular feature, and the manner
in which it is used. The work in [15], which is very similar in terms of objective
to the VMU task that we study in this paper, tries to distinguish between fake
and real images shared on Twitter by using decision tree-based classification
models on tweet text and Twitter account features. Using Hurricane Sandy as
the evaluation dataset, they report a 97% detection accuracy.
2.2 Source and user credibility on social networks
Several approaches focus on the study of user behaviour on social networks as
well as on the detection of spam accounts. Stringhini et al. [36] investigated
techniques for automated identification of spam accounts on Twitter by detect-
ing anomalous behaviour. They used six features (friend-follower ratio, URL
ratio in messages, similarity of messages sent by a user, friend choice, mes-
sages sent, friend number) in a classification model and managed to identify
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about 15,000 spam accounts on Twitter. Canini et al. [9] proposed a method,
that, given a particular topic, identifies relevant users, based on a combina-
tion of their expertise and trust. The authors employed an LDA topic model,
using keywords extracted from the user profile, to estimate the association
between a user account and a topic and then rank them based on their credi-
bility. Additionally, Starbird et al. [35] examined an automated mechanism for
identifying Twitter accounts providing eyewitness testimony from the ground.
They used profile features, such as number of statuses and of followers, and
features that describe how the Twitter community interacts with the user
during the event. Finally, they applied an SVM classifier with asymmetric soft
margins and they managed to achieve promising results on the task. Two of
the methods proposed in this work also use features derived from social media
accounts (including newly proposed features) with the aim of finding common
characteristics of users that tend to share misleading content.
2.3 Image forensics
Image forensics has been long used for assessing the authenticity of images by
detecting whether a digital image has been manipulated. Image manipulation
is typically classified as splicing (transferring an object from an image and
injecting it into another), copy-move (copying an object from the same image
to a different position) or retouching (enhancing contrast, sharpening edges or
applying color filters). These manipulations normally leave digital traces that
forensics methods try to detect. The method in [14] exploits inconsistencies
in the Color Filter Array (CFA) interpolation patterns, allowing for accurate
splice localization. Since the most common format of digital images is JPEG,
numerous methods try to exploit traces left by the JPEG compression pro-
cess. In [24] and [31], different methods are proposed to determine whether an
image was previously JPEG compressed. In [3], original and forged regions are
discriminated in double compressed images for both aligned (A-DJPG) and
non-aligned JPG (NA-DJPG). Double and triple compressions are detected
and discriminated in [30], by exploiting the analysis of the Benford-Fourier
coefficients. A method for tampered regions detection was proposed in [23] on
the block artifact grids (BAG), which are caused by the block-based processing
during JPEG compression and are usually mismatched in copy-move or splic-
ing manipulations. Other methods aim to detect non-native JPEG images by
analyzing quantization tables, thumbnails and information embedded in Exif
metadata [22]. For copy-move detection, many methods have been proposed
in the recent years, mainly based on the matching of keypoints [2], or regions
[18]. For detecting image retouching, most current methods exploit illumina-
tion or shadow inconsistencies [28], or geometric relations disagreement [12]
within an image. Despite the proliferation of image forensics methods, a recent
experimental study [39] has concluded that many of them are ineffective on
real cases of manipulated images sourced from the Web and social media due
to the fact that such images typically undergo multiple resaving operations
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that destroy a considerable part of the forensic traces. Nonetheless, one of
the compared methods in our study makes use of forensics features (extracted
from the image accompanying the tweet) as additional verification signals.
2.4 Systems for assessing content credibility
In the context of assessing content credibility, Ratkiewicz et al. developed the
Truthy system [33] for real-time tracking of political memes on Twitter and
for detecting misinformation, focusing on political astroturf. Truthy collects
tweets, detects memes and introduces a web interface that lets users anno-
tate the memes they consider truthful. Another system for evaluating Twitter
content is TweetCred [16], a system that computes for each tweet a credibil-
ity score. It takes the form of a Web application that can be installed as a
Chrome extension. The system encourages users to give feedback by declaring
whether they agree or not with the produced score. We include TweetCred in
our comparative experimental study as a state-of-the-art method.
2.5 Verifying Multimedia Use (VMU) task
To assess the effectiveness of automated tweet verification methods, we rely on
resources produced by the VMU task [4], which was introduced in 2015 as part
of the MediaEval benchmarking initiative. The definition of the task is the fol-
lowing: “Given a tweet and the accompanying multimedia item (image or video)
from an event of potential interest for the international news audience, return
a binary decision representing verification of whether the multimedia item re-
flects the reality of the event in the way purported by the tweet.” In practice,
participants received a list of tweets that include images or video and were
required to automatically predict, for each tweet, whether it is trustworthy
or deceptive (real or fake respectively). An unknown label is also accepted
in case that there is no available prediction for a tweet. In addition to fully
automated approaches, the task also considered human-assisted approaches
provided that they are practical (i.e., fast enough) in real-world settings, such
as manually identifying the veracity of a multimedia item by searching on
trustworthy online websites or resources. The following considerations should
be made in addition to the above definition:
– A tweet is considered fake when it shares multimedia content that does not
faithfully represent the event it refers to. The variety of untrustworthy and
misused content appearing in the context of past events led us to devise a
small typology of misleading use of multimedia content (see Fig. 2).
– A tweet is considered to be real when it shares multimedia that accurately
represents the event it refers to.
– A tweet that shares content that does not represent accurately the event
it refers to but reports the false information or refers to it with a sense of
humour is neither considered fake nor real (and hence not included in
the datasets released by the task).
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Fig. 2: Different types of misleading multimedia use. From left to right: a) re-
posting an old photo showing soldiers guarding the Tomb of the Unknown Sol-
dier claiming it was captured during the Hurricane Sandy in 2012, b) reposting
digital artwork as a photo from the solar eclipse in March 2015, c) specula-
tion of depicted people as being suspects of the Boston Marathon bombings
in 2013, d) spliced sharks on a photo captured during the Hurricane Sandy.
For each tweet, the task has also released three types of feature:
– tweet-based (TB-base): Extracted from the tweet itself, e.g. the number of
terms, the number of mentions and hashtags, etc. [8].
– user-based (UB-base): Based on the Twitter profile, e.g. the number of
friends and followers, the account age, whether the user is verified, etc. [8].
– forensics (FOR): Forensic features extracted from the visual content of the
tweet image, and specifically the probability map of the aligned double
JPEG compression, the potential primary quantization steps for the first
six DCT coefficients of the non-aligned JPEG compression, and the PRNU
(Photo-Response Non-Uniformity) [13].
3 Description of verification approaches
3.1 Using attribution, fake and genuine claim extraction (UoS-ITI)
This approach is motivated by an established journalistic process for verifying
social media content [34]. The central hypothesis is that the “wisdom of the
crowds” is not really wisdom when it comes to verifying suspicious content.
Instead it is better to rank evidence from Twitter according to the most trusted
and credible sources in a way similar to the one practiced by journalists.
A trust and credibility model was created based on an NLP pipeline involv-
ing tokenization, Part-Of-Speech (POS) tagging, Named Entity Recognition
(NER) and Relation Extraction (RE). The novelty of this approach lies within
the choice of regex patterns, which are modelled on how journalists verify fake
and genuine claims by looking at the source attribution for each claim, and
the semi-automated workflow allowing trusted lists of entities to be utilized.
A novel conflict resolution approach was created based on ranking claims in
order of trustworthiness. To extract fake and genuine claims, a set of regex
patterns were created (see Fig. 3) matching both terms and POS tags. Claims
of an image being fake or genuine occur infrequently, and by themselves are
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not sufficient. If an image is claimed to be real without any supporting at-
tribution we assume it is fake, since from our own analysis strong debunking
posts almost always contain attribution. We combine all fake and real claims
with trusted source attribution (e.g. via BBC News) to discover strong evi-
dence. To extract attribution, a combination of Named Entity (NE) matching,
based on noun and proper noun sequences, and regex patterns for source cita-
tion was used. Other researchers have published linguistic patterns that were
used to detect rumours [8,10,40], but the combination of fake/genuine claims
and source attribution used by the UoS-ITI approach is novel in that it uses
insights from well-established journalistic processes for social media content.
First, an NLP pipeline is executed (see Fig. 4) that takes in each tweet
from the test dataset and tokenizes it using a Punkt sentence tokenizer and
a Treebank word tokenizer. To help the POS tagger, no stemming is applied
and text case is preserved. Each tokenized sentence is passed to a Treebank
POS tagger, which supports more European multi-lingual tagsets than other
taggers (e.g., Stanford POS tagger), an important consideration for future
 
 
Named Entity Patterns  Examples 
@ <ANY> 
(NOUN | PROP_NOUN | NAMESPACE) 
(NOUN | PROP_NOUN | NAMESPACE) (NOUN | PROP_NOUN 
| NAMESPACE) 
@bbcnews, BBC News, CNN.com, CNN 
 
Attribution Patterns 
 
…<NE> <SYMBOL> <URl>  
<NE> *{0,1} <lMAGE> *(0,2) <URl> … 
<NE> *{0,1} <FROM> *{0,2} <URl> … 
<RT> <SYMBOL>{0,1} <NE> … 
… <FROM> *{0,2} <NE>   
What a great picture! @bbcnews: http://bit.|y/1234 
@bbcnews image - http://bit.|y/1234  
@bbcnews releases photo http://bit.|y/1234  
RT: @bbcnews "|ove|y picture of … 
… eyewitness report via @bbcnews 
Faked Patterns 
 
… <lMAGE> *{0,1} ^<POSnot> <FAKED> … 
… <POSis> <POSa>{0,1}^<POSnot> <FAKED> *{0,1} <lMAGE> … 
… <POSis>{0,1} <POSnot> <POSa>{0,1} <REAL> … 
… image is fake! ... 
… is a fake image … 
… Is not a real … 
Genuine Patterns 
 
… <lMAGE> <POSis> *{0,1} ^<POSnot> <REAL> …   
… <POSis> <POSa>{0,1} ^<POSnot> <REAL> *{0,1} <lMAGE> …     
… <POSis>{0,1} <POSnot> <POSa>{0,1} <FAKE> … 
 
… image is totally genuine … 
… is a real image … 
… Is not a fake …  
 
Key 
 
(mm) = n to m matches allowed  
<NE> = named entity  
<SYMBOL> = symbols (e.g. : = -)  
<POSnot> = POS adverbs RB (e.g. not, never)  
<POSis> = POS verbs VBZ, VBD (e.g. is, was)  
<POSa> = POS determiner DT (e.g. a, the)  
 
 
* = any non-whitespace characters 
^ = forbit match 
<lMAGE> = image variants (e.g. image, video) 
<FROM> = from variants (e.g. via, attributed) 
<FAKED> = fake variants (e.g. fake, hoax) 
<REAL> = real variants (e.g. real, genuine) 
<RT> = RT variants (e.g. RT, MT) 
 Fig. 3: Verification Linguistic Patterns in UoS-ITI. These patterns are encoded
as regex patterns matching on both phrases in content and their associated
POS tags (e.g. NN = noun, NNP = proper noun).
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work as breaking news can happen anywhere in the world, not just English
speaking locations. Namespaces and URI’s are extracted prior to tokenization
and re-inserted after POS tagging as explicit NEs so they can be matched
using regex expressions later.
The employed NER strategy is based on a regex POS expression that
matches unigrams and bigrams with nouns, proper nouns, namespaces and
Twitter usernames. This is a high recall-low precision approach to NER as we
want to capture all relevant NEs at this stage. Next, a lookup table is used
to filter candidate NEs into sets of trusted, untrusted and unknown entities;
this allows the removal of known false positive NE values and the application
of blaklist and whitelist values. Finally, candidate NEs are used to create the
POS and NE-labelled sentence, which is passed to a set of regex expressions
encoding typical relationship phrases for fake, real and attribution claims.
The approach is semi-automated in that it exploits a list of a priori known
trusted and untrusted sources. All news providers have long lists of trusted
sources for different regions around the world so this information is readily
available. For this task, a list of candidate NEs was created by first running
the NER regex patterns on the test dataset. Then, each NE was manually
checked via Google search (e.g. looking at Twitter profile pages) and NEs were
removed that were considered as irrelevant for inclusion in a list of trusted
or untrusted sources by a journalist. Instead, NEs were kept that included
news organizations, respected journalists and well cited bloggers and experts.
Creating these lists took under two hours (570 NEs checked, 60 accepted).
The employed RE approach uses a set of regex expressions that match seri-
alized POS and NE tagged sentence trees. These regex expressions were man-
ually created after a detailed analysis of the linguistic patterns from Twitter,
YouTube and Instagram around a number of previously crawled event types
(e.g., hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes, blackouts, conflicts, etc.). For finding
attributed NEs, all the common ways were studied, in which social media users
Social Media Text
(e.g. Tweet)
Clean & Tokenize 
(sent and word)
POS Tagging
Named Entity 
Recognition
Compute 
Sentence Tree 
Variants
Relational 
Extraction 
(regex patterns)
(Un)Trusted 
entity Matching
Image Content 
Cross-check
Trustworthiness 
Assessment
Decision 
(fake, real)
Multi-lingual  
Grammer –
Named Entity 
Regex
Multi-lingual  
Grammer
- Attribution 
Regex
- Faked Regex
- Genuine Regex
Information Extraction
Trust and Credibility Analysis
Stoplist Entities
Trusted Entities
Untrusted Entities
TreeTagger
Entity Recognition
Fig. 4: NLP pipeline for regex-based NER and RE in UoS-ITI.
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attribute sources. This is typically either as a reference to a NE followed by
a link or image reference, or a statement claiming that a link or image refer-
ence is created and/or verified by an NE. For fake and genuine claims, regex
patterns are created from the most commonly phrased claims about images or
links being fake or real. Examples of the regex patterns can be seen in Fig. 3
and make heavy use of the POS tags to avoid being overly term specific.
Once all the attributed sources, fake and genuine claims have been iden-
tified, a trustworthiness decision for each image is made. Just like human
journalists, claims are ranked by trustworthiness based on whether the claim
comes directly from a trusted author (top rank), is attributed to a trusted
source (second rank) or is from an unknown source (third rank). Claims di-
rectly by, or attributed to, untrusted sources are ignored. The final decision
for each image is taken based on only the most trustworthy claims. A con-
servative claim conflict resolution approach is used, where a fake claim by a
source supersedes a real claim by an equally trusted source.
3.2 Using a two-level classification model (MCG-ICT)
Existing approaches often formulate the tweet verification problem as a binary
classification task [8]. Features from tweet text and users are extracted to train
a classifier at the message (tweet) level. One problem of this training strategy
is that tweets are trained and tested individually. However, tweets in the real
world have strong relations among each other, especially, tweets of the same
topic will likely have the same credibility: real or fake.
Rather than classifying each tweet individually, the MCG-ICT approach
verifies tweets by leveraging inter-tweet information, such as whether they
contain the same multimedia content. It was empirically observed that even
such simple implications among tweets would be useful to boost the original
message-level predictions. In fact, in recent work [19,20], links among tweets
were built by clustering tweets into sub-events or topics. Thus, credibility eval-
uation can be performed at different scales to provide more robust predictions.
3.2.1 Two-level classification model
As illustrated in Fig. 5, the MCG-ICT approach comprises two levels of clas-
sification: a) The message-level, which learns a credibility model per message
(tweet). Features extracted from the text content, user information and other
components of a tweet are used for training a classifier. b) The topic-level, i.e.
a specific subject of discussion or sub-event under the broader unfolding event.
By assuming tweets under a same topic likely have similar credibility values,
tweets are clustered into different topics. Compared with raw tweets, topics
eliminate variations of tweets by aggregating message-level credibility classifi-
cations. The topic-level feature is computed as the average of the tweet-level
feature vectors around the topic. The following processing steps take place for
topic-level classification:
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– Topic clustering : In [19], a clustering algorithm is used to cluster tweets
into sub-events. But this algorithm performs poorly in forming topics in
the target dataset as it is difficult to decide the optimal number of clusters.
However, in the studied verification setting, each tweet contains an image
or video, and each image/video can be contained in more than one tweets.
This intrinsic one-to-many relation is used to form topics: each image/video
corresponds to a topic and tweets containing it are assigned to this topic.
– Topic labeling : Each topic is labelled using the majority of the labels of its
tweets. These labels are used for training the topic-level classifier. In fact,
with the proposed topic formation method, almost all tweets in a topic
have the same label, resulting in topics labelled with very high confidence.
– Topic-level feature aggregation: Message-level features (section 3.2.2) of all
tweets in a topic are aggregated by averaging them to derive a single topic-
level feature vector. By taking the average of all tweets, the impact of noisy
or outlier tweets is suppressed.
– Fusing topic-level result : After topic-level classification, a probability value
is computed for each topic representing the likelihood of it being fake.
Then, for each tweet in the topic, this value is added as a feature to its
original feature vector. Finally, a message-level classifier is trained with
this extended feature in order to produce the final results.
In terms of classification model, several options from the state of the art were
tested, and the selection was based on the performance on the development
set using cross validation. J48 Decision Trees were selected for the topic-level
classification, and Random Forests for the message-level classification.
3.2.2 Feature extraction
At the message level, we use as base features the ones shared by the task,
TB-base and UB-base (Sec. 2.5). Some additional features were also tested
Tweets
Feature Set
Content Features  User Features  Other Features
Message Level 
Classifier
Final Results
Topics
Topic Labeling
Topic Level 
Features
Topic Level 
Classifier
Pre-results
Clustering
Feature Extraction
Feature Aggregation
Fig. 5: Overview of the MCG-ICT two-level classification model. Topic-level
classifications are fused with the message-level ones to produce the final result.
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but not included in the final approach configuration: word term features and
several image features.
The commonly used term frequency (tf) and tf-idf features were tested. Ex-
periments on the training (development) set indicated that such features could
lead to overfitting, since they led to very high performance on general cross-
validation and very low performance on leave-one-event-out cross-validation.
Since few words co-occur across different events, one may assume that other
keyword-based features (e.g., LDA) would also contribute little to this task.
Several image-based features (e.g. image popularity, resolution) were also
tested. Such image features could replace the topic level features to train clas-
sifier at topic level, because a topic is generated for each image as mentioned
earlier. Experiments on the development set showed that these features led
to slightly worse performance for the topic-level classification, compared to
content-based ones, and to much worse performance when combined with
message-level features. Moreover, image features cannot be applied directly
on videos included in the test set. Hence, those were not further considered.
3.3 Using an agreement-based retraining scheme (CERTH-UNITN)
This approach combines different sets of tweet-based (TB), user-based (UB)
and forensics (FOR) features in a semi-supervised learning scheme. A more
detailed exposition of this method is presented in [5]. The approach builds on
supervised classification models and an agreement-retraining method that uses
part of its own predictions as new training samples with the goal of adapting
to tweets posted in the context of new events.
Fig. 6 depicts an overview of the method. It relies on two individual clas-
sification models, one based on the combination of TB and FOR features and
a second based on UB features. Bagging is used to ensure higher reliability in
the training process of the classifiers (CL11 ... CL1n and CL21 ... CL2n), and
an agreement-based retraining strategy (fusion) is employed with the goal of
improving the accuracy of the overall framework. All classifiers are based on
Random Forests of 100 trees.
3.3.1 Feature extraction
The approach uses the TB-ext and UB-ext features, which are an extended
version of the TB-base and UB-base released by the MediaEval task. For the
FOR features, we also include additional ones.
TB-ext: These are binary features extracted from the tweet text, e.g. the
presence of a word, symbol or external link. Language-specific binary features
are also used corresponding to the presence of specific terms; for languages, in
which such terms are not available, the values of these features are set to null
(missing). Language detection is performed with a publicly available library4,
4 https://code.google.com/p/language-detection/
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Fig. 6: Overview of the CERTH-UNITN method.
and a feature is added for the number of slang words in a text, using slang
lists in English5 and Spanish6. For the number of nouns, the Stanford parser7
is used to assign POS tags to each word (only in English). For the readability of
text, the Flesch Reading Ease method is used8, which computes the complexity
of a piece of text as a score in [0, 100] (0: hard-to-read, 100: easy-to-read).
UB-ext: User-specific features are extracted such as number of media content,
account age and others that refer to information that the profile shares. In
addition, these include whether the user declares a location and whether this
can be matched to a city name from the Geonames dataset9.
For both TB and UB features, trust-oriented features are computed for the
links shared, through the tweet itself (TB) or the user profile (UB). These include
the WOT metric10, a score indicating how trustworthy a website is according
to reputation ratings by Web users, the in-degree and harmonic centrality,
which are rankings based on the links of the web forming a graph11, and web
metrics provided by the Alexa API12.
FOR: For each image, additional forensics features are extracted from the pro-
vided BAG feature based on the maps obtained from AJPG and NAJPG. First, a
binary map is created by thresholding the AJPG map (we use 0.6 as thresh-
old), then the largest region is selected as object and the rest of the map is
considered as the background. For both regions, seven descriptive statistics
(max, min, mean, median, most frequent value, st. deviation, and variance)
are computed from the BAG values and concatenated to a 14-d vector. Figure 7
illustrates the feature extraction process. We apply the same process on the
NAJPG map to obtain a second feature vector.
5 http://onlineslangdictionary.com/word-list/0-a/
6 http://www.languagerealm.com/spanish/spanishslang.php
7 http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/lex-parser.shtml
8 http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flesch_Reading_Ease
9 http://download.geonames.org/export/dump/cities1000.zip
10 https://www.mywot.com/
11 http://wwwranking.webdatacommons.org/more.html
12 http://data.alexa.com/data?cli=10&dat=snbamz&url=google.gr
Verifying Information with Multimedia Content on Twitter 15
Input Image (real) AJPG Object/Background Mask
BAG
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.5
1
Descriptive Statistics
Object
Background
Input Image (fake) AJPG Object/Background Mask
BAG
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.5
1
Descriptive Statistics
Object
Background
Fig. 7: Illustration of forensics feature extraction process.
3.3.2 Data pre-processing and bagging
To handle the issue of missing values on the features, Linear Regression (LR) is
used for interpolating missing values. This is applied only to numeric features
as the method is not applicable for boolean values. Only feature values from
the training set are used in this process. Data normalization is performed to
scale values to the range [-1, 1]. Furthermore, bagging is used to improve the
accuracy of the method. Bagging creates m different subsets of the training set,
including equal number of samples for each class (some samples may appear
in multiple subsets), leading to the creation of m instances of CL1 and CL2
classifiers (m = 9), as shown in Fig. 6. The final prediction for each of the test
samples is calculated using the majority vote of the m predictions.
3.3.3 Agreement-based retraining
Agreement-based retraining is used to improve the prediction accuracy for un-
seen events. This is motivated by a similar approach implemented in [37] on
the problem of polarity classification. To this end, two classifiers are built
CL1, CL2, each on different types of feature, and their outputs are combined
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as follows: The two outputs for each sample of the test set are compared,
and depending on their agreement, the test set is divided in two subsets, the
agreed and disagreed sets. Assuming that the agreed predictions are correct
with high likelihood, they are used as training samples to build a new classifier
for classifying the disagreed set of instances. To this end, in the subsequent
step, the agreed samples are added to the best performing of the two initial
models, CL1, CL2 (comparing them on the basis of their performance using
cross-validation on the training set). The goal of this method is to retrain the
initial model and adapt it to the specific characteristics of the new event. In
that way, the model can predict more accurately the values of the samples for
which CL1, CL2 did not agree in the first step.
4 Experiments and Evaluation
4.1 Datasets
The conducted experiments were based on the benchmark dataset released
by the VMU task in 2015 (Sec. 2.5). We refer to the original version of the
dataset as dataset#1. This has been collected over a number of years using a
crowd-sourcing approach. Images are found by volunteers (including the au-
thors of the article), and paid micro-workers (via Amazon Mechanical Turk).
Each suggested content item was provided with associated news reports or de-
bunking articles by journalists, offering evidence regarding its veracity. These
were then used to provide ground truth labels (real/fake) for each tweet.
The dataset consists of tweets relating to 17 events listed in Table 1, com-
prising in total 197 cases of real and 191 cases of misused images, associated
with 6,225 real and 9,404 fake tweets posted by 5,895 and 9,025 unique Twitter
users respectively. Note that several of the events, e.g., Columbian Chemicals,
Passport Hoax and Rock Elephant, were actually hoaxes, hence all multimedia
content associated with them was fake. For several real events (e.g., MA flight
370) no real images (and hence no real tweets) are included in the dataset,
since none came up as a result of the conducted data collection process.
For further testing, we additionally created dataset#2, which is a subset of
dataset#1 by first performing near-duplicate tweet removal: we empirically set
a minimum threshold of similarity and computed the Levenshtein Distance13
for each pair of texts. A small amount of near-duplicate texts exceeding the
threshold were manually removed. Note that in dataset#1 the number of
unique fake and real multimedia items, which the tweets are associated with,
is highly unbalanced. As the aim of dataset#2 is to create a balanced dataset,
we randomly selected a subset of fake and real multimedia items as well as the
tweets associated with them.
Finally, to assess the stability of results, we also compared the methods
on the dataset that was used in the VMU task sequel in 2016 [6]. This is a
superset of dataset#1, using the latter as development set, while it contains
13 http://rosettacode.org/wiki/Levenshtein_distance#Java
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an additional 998 real and 1,230 fake tweets in the test set, organized around
64 cases of real and 66 cases of misused multimedia items. The tweet IDs and
image URLs for all of the above datasets are publicly available14.
Table 1: Upper part: MediaEval’15 events and derivative datasets (#1, #2):
For each event, we report the numbers of unique real (if available) and fake
images (IR, IF respectively), unique tweets that shared those images (TR, TF )
and unique Twitter accounts that posted those tweets (UR, UF ). Bottom
part: MediaEval’16 events and corresponding statistics.
ID Event
dataset#1 dataset#2
IR TR UR IF TF UF IR TR UR IF TF UF
E1 Hurricane Sandy 150 4,664 4,446 53 5,558 5,432 60 838 825 16 376 369
E2 Boston Marathon bombing 29 344 310 35 189 187 18 131 120 13 56 56
E3 Sochi Olympics - - - 14 274 252 - - - 9 76 74
E4 MA flight 370 - - - 23 310 302 - - - 13 88 87
E5 Bring Back Our Girls - - - 7 131 126 - - - 6 35 33
E6 Columbian Chemicals - - - 15 185 87 - - - 6 124 64
E7 Passport hoax - - - 2 44 44 - - - 1 5 5
E8 Rock Elephant - - - 1 13 13 - - - 1 4 4
E9 Underwater bedroom - - - 3 113 112 - - - 2 4 4
E10 Livr mobile app - - - 4 9 9 - - - 3 6 6
E11 Pig fish - - - 1 14 14 - - - 1 4 4
E12 Solar Eclipse 5 140 133 6 137 135 2 55 54 3 53 53
E13 Girl with Samurai boots - - - 3 218 212 - - - 2 16 16
E14 Nepal Earthquake 11 1004 934 20 356 343 6 113 107 8 178 176
E15 Garissa Attack 2 73 72 2 6 6 2 40 39 2 4 4
E16 Syrian boy - - - 1 1786 1692 - - - 1 197 195
E17 Varoufakis and zdf - - - 1 61 59 - - - 1 29 28
Total 197 6,225 5,895 191 9,404 9,025 88 1,177 1,145 88 1,255 1,178
Event IF TF IR TR Event IF TF IR TR
Gandhi Dancing 1 29 - - Woman 14 children 2 11 - -
Half of Everything 9 39 - - American Soldier Quran 1 17 - -
Hubble Telescope 1 18 - - Airstrikes 1 24 - -
Immigrants fear 5 33 3 18 Attacks in Paris 3 44 22 536
ISIS children 2 3 - - Ankara Explosions - - 3 19
John Guevara 1 33 - - Bush book 1 27 - -
Mc Donalds Fee 1 6 - - Black Lion 1 7 - -
Nazi Submarine 2 11 - - Boko Haram 1 31 - -
North Korea 2 10 - - Bowie David 2 24 4 48
Not Afraid 2 32 3 35 Brussels Car Metro 3 41 - -
Pakistan Explosion 1 53 - - Brussels Explosions 3 69 1 9
Pope Francis 1 29 - - Burst in KFC 1 25 - -
Protest 1 30 10 34 Convoy Explosion Turkey - - 3 13
Refugees 4 35 13 33 Donald Trump Attacker 1 25 - -
Rio Moon 1 33 - - Eagle Kid 1 334 - -
Snowboard Girl 2 14 - - Five Headed Snake 5 6 - -
Soldier Stealing 1 1 - - Fuji Lenticular Clouds 1 123 1 53
Syrian Children 1 12 1 200 Total 66 1,230 64 998
Ukrainian Nazi 1 1 - -
4.2 Measuring accuracy by leave-one-event-out cross-validation
The conducted experiments aimed at evaluating the accuracy of each method
on a variety of unseen events. The features of fake tweets may vary across
different events, so the generalization ability of automated methods is consid-
ered an important aspect of its verification performance. To this end, we used
14 https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/image-verification-corpus/
18 Christina Boididou et al.
each time one of the events Ei, i = {1, 2, ..., 17} for testing, and the remaining
ones for training. For example, for evaluating the performance on event E1,
we used the tweets of E2, E3, ..., E17 for training, and the tweets of E1 for
testing. This is in contrast to the MediaEval task, where events E1-11 were
used for training, and E12-17 for testing. To evaluate the approaches, we used
the established measures of precision (p), recall, and F1 -score (F1). Assuming
that the positive class is the case that a tweet instance is fake, and negative
that a tweet instance is real, we define these metrics as:
p =
tp
tp + fp
, F1 =
2 · tp
2 · tp + fp + fn (1)
where tp refers to true positives (correctly detected fake), fp to false positives
(real misclassified as fake), and fn to false negatives (fake as real).
Table 2 presents the precision and F1-scores that the approaches achieved
in the context of the MediaEval tasks and on dataset#1 and dataset#2. We
also compare our results with those presented by the TweetCred method [16].
We have re-implemented a variation of the method described in the paper: we
identified the common tweet- and user-based features that the CERTH-UNITN
and TweetCred methods use, and we built classification models for each of the
datasets. We evaluated common state-of-the-art classifiers on each dataset:
SVM, RandomForest and AdaBoost. For the first two datasets (MediaEval
’15 and dataset#1), SVM achieved the highest performance, while for the
rest RandomForest worked best. As can be seen, TweedCred ranks second on
two of the datasets (dataset#2 and MediaEval’16), third on MediaEval’15
and first on dataset#1.
Table 2: Precision and F1-scores achieved on a) MediaEval VMU 2015
task, with E1-11 used for training and E12-17 for testing, b) dataset#1, c)
dataset#2, and d) MediaEval VMU 2016 task. For b and c, the leave-one-
event-out cross-validation method was used for measuring performance.
Method
MediaEval ’15 dataset#1 dataset#2 MediaEval ’16
p F1 p F1 p F1 p F1
UoS-ITI 1.000 0.830 0.938 0.224 0.917 0.244 0.520 0.468
MCG-ICT 0.964 0.942 0.804 0.756 0.816 0.750 0.563 0.504
CERTH-UNITN 0.861 0.911 0.755 0.693 0.690 0.635 0.980 0.911
TweedCred [16] 0.680 0.800 0.810 0.820 0.810 0.650 0.580 0.720
Fig. 8 illustrates the F1-scores of the tested approaches for each event of
dataset#1 and dataset#2. The mean performance of the approaches is also
illustrated in red. Events are ordered based on the F1-score achieved by the
highest-scoring method (MCG-ITI). On average, it is clear that on dataset#1
the two-level classification method (MCG-ITI) outperforms the other two.
However, given that it strongly relies on the fact that tweets are correlated
when they share the same multimedia content, it seems that it performs better
on events that comprise only one or few unique multimedia cases (e.g. Passport
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Fig. 8: F1-scores for dataset#1 and dataset#2 per event and approach.
hoax, Syrian boy). When a single event includes numerous multimedia cases
(e.g., Nepal earthquake), its performance decreases. The UoS-ITI approach
seems to accurately predict the posts associated with video content (Syrian
boy, Varoufakis and zdf). Similar results are obtained on dataset#2 (Fig. 8).
In addition to F1-scores, we also report the corresponding precision scores
in Fig. 9 for each event on dataset#1 and dataset#2. In both cases, the
UoS-ITI approach outperforms the other two, providing a very high precision
(> 0.9) for the small set of tweets it was able to classify. This is an important
observation, since it allows us to use the results of UoS-ITI as a type of pre-
classifier in an ensemble-based approach (Sec. 4.4).
Another striking finding concerns the stability of performance of the three
methods when testing them on a different dataset (Mediaeval ’16). The CERTH-
UNITN approach is a clear winner in this case, since it is the only approach
that manages to retain its performance at comparable levels, while the other
two approaches perform considerably worse. This provides evidence in support
of the generalization ability of the agreement-based retraining method.
4.3 Measuring verification performance per multimedia item
A further experiment explores the verification accuracy of methods on each
unique multimedia item. Given that dataset#1 contains 388 unique multime-
dia items, we divided tweets in groups according to the multimedia item they
are associated with. Then, we calculate the performance of each approach on
each of those unique multimedia cases. Fig. 10 illustrates the achieved F1-
scores. In the horizontal axis, we present the unique multimedia items. The
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Fig. 9: Precision scores for dataset#1 and dataset#2 per event and approach.
figure reveals that the MCG-ITI and CERTH-UNITN approaches perform
similarly in the majority of cases, while the UoS-ITI achieves quite low per-
formance compared to them, due to the fact that it avoids producing a result
in cases where there is not sufficient information to make this decision.
Another key question of this analysis is the level of overlap between the
method results. For this reason, we conduct pairwise comparisons between
the previously generated F1-score distributions. After calculating the number
of multimedia items for which the methods have an F1-score equal to zero
and equal to one, we report the percentage of items, for which the methods’
predictions agree. In addition, we calculate the Pearson correlation between
these distributions. Table 3 presents the results of this analysis. These make
clear that the three approaches are highly correlated in terms of the cases
they fail to predict (F1-score = 0) and less correlated in the cases where
they succeed (F1-score = 1). The pairwise Pearson correlations demonstrate
that MCG-ICT and CERTH-UNITN approaches are much more similar in
their predictions compared to UoS-ITI. Overall, these experiments reveal that
there is potential for improving upon the results of the individual methods by
fusing their results, which we investigate in the next section.
4.4 An ensemble verification approach
We investigate three ensemble methods for fusing the results of the three
approaches:
– ENS-MAJ: For each tweet, we aggregate individual predictions by ma-
jority vote. However, in the UoS-ITI approach, several of the predictions
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Table 3: Pairwise comparison of F1-score distributions. Reporting percentages
(%) where the F1-score of both methods is equal to 0 and 1, and the Pearson
correlation between them.
F1=0 F1=1 pearson corr
UoS-ITI vs MCG-ICT 53.3 0.7 0.295
UoS-ITI vs CERTH-UNITN 59.5 6.7 0.332
MCG-ICT vs CERTH-UNITN 51.5 9.5 0.707
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Fig. 10: F1-score across unique images for each approach. To make the visu-
alization of results cleaner, images in the x axis are sorted based on the mean
F-score across the three approaches.
are marked as unknown, which is a problem in case the decisions of the
other two approaches disagree. To overcome this tie, we assign the tweet
as fake, assuming that it is preferable to falsely consider a case to be fake
than falsely consider it as real.
– ENS-HPF: This takes advantage of the high precision (low fp rate) of
the UoS-ITI method. If the UoS-ITI prediction for a tweet is other than
unknown, we adopt it as correct; otherwise, we check the other methods’
predictions and in case of disagreement we consider the item to be fake.
– ENS-ORA: This is a hypothetical (oracle) ensemble method, which se-
lects the correct prediction if at least one of the methods’ predictions is
correct. This provides an upper-bound of the performance that could be
theoretically possible if we could optimally combine the three approaches.
Fig. 11 presents the resulting F1-scores and precision per event of the ensemble
methods. On average, these achieve higher performance than the individual
approaches. This result stems from the complementarity of the approaches’
outputs, which was illustrated in sec. 4.3, and the effectiveness of the pro-
posed schemes in combining their outputs. ENS-ORA delineates the maxi-
mum possible performance that is achievable by combining the three methods.
Out of the two practical fusion schemes, ENS-HPF produces more accurate
predictions compared to ENS-MAJ as the former uses the highly accurate
UoS-ITI approach as the preferred approach for performing the classification
and falls back to the other two approaches in case UoS-ITI produces no result.
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Fig. 11: F1-scores and Precision of the ENS-MAJ, ENS-HPF and ENS-ORA en-
semble methods for dataset#1, mean score of each method on the dataset of
MediaEval ’16 and individual mean scores of the approaches.
4.5 Relevance of experimental results for real-world use cases
These promising results from our ensemble verification approach should also
be seen in the context of typical use cases for automated verification of images
and videos trending on social media.
An example use case involving semi-automated verification is in support of
journalists who are trying to verify social media content for use in news stories.
Breaking news in particular has competing objectives to publish content first
(i.e. as quickly as possible) and get the verification right (i.e. take enough
Verifying Information with Multimedia Content on Twitter 23
time to ensure that the content is not fake). Publishing eyewitness content
before rivals will gain a journalist much kudos. Publishing a fake image, then
later being forced to retract the story, can seriously damage a journalist’s
reputation. Let us consider a use case where a journalist wants to receive
a live feed (e.g. every 5 or 10 minutes) of the top 500 trending images on
Twitter, classified and filtered using our ensemble of fake classifiers. Our best
reported result (F1=0.79, p=0.82, r=0.81) means that on average for 500
trending images, only 90 would be classified in error. During news events such
as the Hurricane Sandy 2012 fake social media images on Twitter [27] [17]
outnumbered real images by two to one. In the context of our use case this
means that of the 500 images considered, 333 would on average be fake, and
of those 333, 273 would be classified as fake and filtered. This represents a
significant reduction in the images the journalist needs to consider in real-time,
something which is very useful when working under breaking news deadlines
where a story must be verified and published within minutes.
Another example user case, this time involving fully automated verification,
is where an automated news summarization platform wants to aggregate news
feeds from sources such as popular social media bloggers in real-time. Readers
of such news summarization platforms typically accept a higher number of
false stories than they would from a journalist-based news service. In this case
the volume of trending images that need checking would be much larger, with
tens of thousands of images being checked as candidates for aggregation into
news alert summary snippets. The fully automated nature of our approach
makes this a viable proposition. Even for platforms like Storyful, where news
snippets are passed to a human checkdesk for a final verification step, our
approach could have significant utility as a pre-filter.
5 Conclusions
In this article, we presented a comparative study for automated approaches
for verifying online information with multimedia content. By presenting three
different in nature methods, we showed that there are several ways to deal
with the challenging problem of verification. To measure verification accuracy,
we evaluated these methods by using leave-one-out cross-validation and by
reporting their scores per multimedia case. In the MediaEval’15 dataset and
dataset#2, the MCG-ICT method achieved the highest F1-scores, particularly
for events with few cases of unique multimedia items. The UoS-ITI achieved
the highest precision scores with a very low false positive rate for the events
it could classify. The CERTH-UNITN method led to consistently high results
on average, and in particular on events with many tweets. Importantly, it
managed to retain its performance on the MediaEval’16 dataset, clearly out-
performing the other two and the TweetCred method, and demonstrating the
potential of the agreement-based retraining scheme for making the approach
applicable to new datasets.
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By combining approaches into an ensemble method we were able to further
increase the F1-score of the best performing method by approximately 7%
(ENS-HPF) with a theoretical upper bound of improvement of approximately
20% (ENS-ORA), which is a very encouraging finding, and provides a state
of the art benchmark for other researchers in this field. To improve results even
further we feel that more sophisticated use of visual and contextual features are
needed. This is a very challenging area and will need a combination of image
forensics, computer vision and cross-referencing of contextual information (e.g.
weather, maps, etc.) about the event of interest.
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